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THE. MONKEY'S PAW: REGULATING THE
DELIBERATE ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASE
OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
ORGANISMS
Abstract: The deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms poses uncertain but
potentially grave risks to the environment. The governing federal and state environmental
regulations are inefficient and do not protect environmental integrity. This Comment
examines the deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms in the context of fed-
eral and state environmental laws. It concludes that the current regulatory schemes are
inadequate and proposes changes to meet the goals of effective environmental regulation.
[Aln English working couple comes into possession of a talisman, a mon-
key's paw said to have been endowed by an Indian holy man with the
virtue of granting its owner three wishes. The couple first wish for[a thou-
sand dollars] shortly thereafter a messenger arrives to inform them that
their son has been killed in a factory accident and that his employer has
offered [a thousand dollars] out of sympathy. Their second wish is that
their son return; it is answered by a strange knocking at the door that the
parents somehow know to be their son-but not in the flesh. The tale ends
with the couple's third wish, that the ghost go away. The moral.., from
this tale is that all magic... "is singularly literal-minded, that if it grants
you anything at all it grants what you ask for, not what you should have
asked for or what you intend[edj. " The risk is that the resulting flaw in
what you get may be less obvious than it was in the case of the monkey's
paw-until it is too late. 1
Genetic engineering is a tool used to manipulate living systems at
the molecular level. Technicians now have the power to alter the
genetic material of life forms to enhance "beneficial" characteristics,
delete "undesirable" characteristics, and even supplement an organism
with altogether new characteristics.2 As applications of this new tech-
nology develop commercially, the manipulated organisms are being
moved from the laboratory into the environment for testing and
assessment. The potential environmental impact is not yet well under-
stood. Now, when commercial development is in its infancy, is a criti-
1. Tribe, Policy Science.: Analysis or Ideology, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 102-03 (1972) (Citing
N. WIENER, GOD & GOLEM, INC., 58-59 (1964) (footnotes omitted)). Technological
development has much the same character as the magic of the monkey's paw. If it grants
anything at all, it grants what is asked for, not what should have been asked for or what was
intended.
2. Applications of genetic engineering techniques stretch into every industrial sector:
agriculture, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, hazardous waste clean-up, disease control, animal
husbandry, and more. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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cal time to anticipate and to attempt to control the environmental
consequences of genetic engineering.
Part I of this Comment discusses genetic engineering and the cur-
rent regulatory schemes governing the environmental release of geneti-
cally engineered organisms. Part II examines these regulatory
schemes in the context of three important goals of environmental regu-
lations: protecting the environment, guiding the commercial develop-
ment of beneficial genetically engineered products, and promoting
meaningful public participation in the regulatory decision-making pro-
cess. Part III recommends changes to the current regulatory schemes
to further the goals of environmental regulation.
I. GENETIC ENGINEERING: TECHNOLOGY AND
REGULATION
Assessing and incorporating new technologies, such as genetic engi-
neering, into the fabric of community life involves a complex appraisal
of scientific ability with respect to societal values. This section dis-
cusses various aspects of the technological assessment of the deliberate
environmental release of genetically engineered organisms. First, the
science of genetic engineering and some current commercial applica-
tions are discussed. Then ecological and economic issues associated
with the development of genetic engineering techniques are explored.
This section concludes with a discussion of the current legislative
schemes guiding the development of genetic engineering techniques.
A. Genetic Engineering: The Technology
1. The Science of Genetic Engineering
The term "genetic engineering" describes techniques used to alter
the genetic material of a living cell.3 In genetic engineering, the gene
or genes encoded for a desired characteristic are extracted from one
organism's genome4 and integrated into the genome of another organ-
3. Glossary of Biotechnology Terms, 1 HIGH TECH. L.J. 253, 255 (1986) [hereinafter Glossary].
Physical characteristics are passed from one generation to the next through discrete segments of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) called genes. S. WOLFE, BIOLOGY: THE FOUNDATIONS 188
(1977). Genes provide directions for all cellular activity and physical characteristics. Each
inherited characteristic is determined by the information in the DNA code. Id.
4. The genome is "[tihe basic chromosome set of an organism-the sum total of its genes."
Glossary, supra note 3, at 255.
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ism.' This enables the receiving organism to produce a specific prod-
uct or provides it with a new characteristic.'
2. Commercial Applications: Environmental Release
Genetic engineering technology is applied, both experimentally and
commercially, to most life forms, including humans.' Contemplated
releases of genetically engineered organisms cover an enormous range
of species, environments and intended applications.8 Applications
involving microorganisms are the most diverse of all.' Microorga-
nisms are the best-and the most troubling--candidates for applica-
tion of genetic engineering technology. Because of their size, mobility,
and the limited understanding of microscopic ecosystems, there is a
very real danger that the release of genetically engineered microorga-
nisms will unintentionally wreak environmental havoc.
3. Ecological Assessment Complexity and Risk
The major environmental concern over the deliberate release of
genetically engineered organisms is the potential for unforeseen and
5. For a more detailed discussion of the science of genetic engineering and its applications, see
1 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS 41-45 (1987) [hereinafter
OWNERSHIP].
6. Consider the corn borer, an insect that causes $400 million in damage each year to corn
crops, although farmers spend $50 million per year on insecticides to combat it. A toxin
produced by the bacteria Bacillus thuringiensis, the B.t. toxin, is fatal to corn borers. Genetic
engineering technicians can remove the B.t toxin gene from Bacillus thuringiensis and insert it
into a plant-dwelling bacteria. Corn seed is then infused with the genetically engineered bacteria.
The toxin-producing bacteria multiplies and carries the toxin throughout the mature corn plant,
providing resistance to corn borer damage. Sterling, Agbio Products Edge Closer to Marketplace,
GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, May 1988, at 15. This illustration is a relatively simple
application. Most authorities agree that the Pandora's box of genetic engineering is only open a
crack. See 3 RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES 500-01
(1988).
7. See OWNERSHIP, supra note 5, at 31-45. For a more detailed discussion of current
commercial applications of genetically engineered organisms, see 3 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: FIELD-TESTING
ENGINEERED ORGANISMS: GENETIC AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES 125-33 (1988) [hereinafter
ECOLOGICAL ISSUES].
8. For example, researchers are attempting to manipulate plants to increase resistance or
tolerance to disease and herbicides, increase nutritional quality, and possibly produce crops
capable of growing in extreme drought or saline conditions. ECOLOGICAL ISSUES, supra note 7,
at 5. Genetic engineering of animals focuses on altering livestock, poultry, and fish to enhance
weight gain, growth, reproductive performance, and disease resistance. Id. at 6.
9. See id. at 7-8. Commercial applications of microorganisms include increasing the nitrogen
fixation efficiency of certain bacteria to increase crop yields, enhancing bacterial ability to
consume petroleum and hazardous wastes, and conferring insecticidal properties to root-dwelling
bacteria to reduce crop losses from insect larvae. Id.
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long-term detrimental ecological effects.1" This results from a limited
understanding of the enormously complex ecosystems that make up
the natural environment. 1 A significant ecological disaster from
existing applications is unlikely. 12 Nevertheless, one small, uninten-
tional ecological disruption could be devastating. 3 In the face of tech-
nological complexity and uncertainty, agency decisionmakers must
assess the risks of environmental release of genetically engineered
organisms. 4
4. Economic Assessment: The Cost of Commercialization
The expected commercial value of genetic engineering techniques
and applications is immense. 15 Presently, however, regulations are
ambiguous and compliance is both expensive and time-consuming for
the biotechnology industry.16 The complex regulatory structure and
lengthy approval processes impede commercialization of genetic engi-
neering technologies without producing corresponding benefits for the
environment and public safety. 7
B. Current Regulatory Structure
1. Federal Regulation: The Coordinated Framework
Currently, six federal agencies regulate biotechnology under the
authority of a mosaic of federal statutes, commonly know as the
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id. at 20. Numerous species of plants, animals and microorganisms form natural
communities, interacting in a complex "living dance" which cycles vital nutrients and energy to
all living organisms. Id.
12. Id. According to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), significant ecological
disruption is unlikely because of "It]he high degree of functional redundancy among species
(particularly microbes) involved with such processes (e.g., nutrient cycles or energy flow) and the
resilience and buffering in natural ecosystems." Id. at 16.
13. Id. at 20.
14. Risk assessment is not new to the scientific or legal community. See generally Rodgers,
Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980). Although numerous risk assessment protocols have been developed
for the release of genetically engineered organisms, none has received wide acceptance.
ECOLOGICAL ISSuEs, supra note 7, at 120.
15. See Industry and Government Experts Project Bright Future for Biotech at IBA Annual
Meeting, IBA REPORTS, Nov. 1989, at 1.
16. The OTA considers regulatory uncertainty a major factor hampering commercialization
of biotechnology. 4 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 11 (1988)
[hereinafter INVESTMENT].
17. Ambiguous regulations influence cost, marketing time, and research and development
requirements. Id.
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"Coordinated Framework."18  The Environmental Protection
Agency's statutory authority is typical of the agencies involved in reg-
ulating deliberate release experiments.19 The EPA uses its existing
statutory authority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)2 ° and the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA)21 to regulate deliberate release experiments.22 The EPA is
also constrained by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),23 which requires federal agencies to consider the potential
environmental impact of their actions.
a. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
FIFRA requires pesticides to be registered with the EPA as a pre-
condition of their distribution or sale.24 Under FIFRA, the EPA reg-
isters the pesticide if it will not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment."25 Manufacturers must obtain an experimental use
permit (EUP) to conduct the small-scale field testing necessary to
develop sufficient data for a registration application.26 Most initial
deliberate release experiments involving genetically engineered organ-
18. The Office of Science and Technology Policy's Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework]. The six
agencies are the: United States Department of Agriculture, Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), Food and Drug Administration, National Institutes of Health (NIH), National Science
Foundation, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Id. at 23,303. The
Coordinated Framework is an interagency cooperative agreement designed to integrate the
operations of the federal agencies regulating biotechnology. Id. at 23,302-03. The Coordinated
Framework provides that "agencies will seek to operate their programs in an integrated and
coordinated fashion and together should cover the full range of plants, animals and
microorganisms derived by the new genetic engineering techniques." Id. at 23,303. Under. the
Coordinated Framework, agency jurisdiction is based primarily on the type and function of the
manipulated organism and the intended product use. Id. at 23,304.
19. This Comment focuses primarily on the EPA's role. The regulatory policy developed by
the EPA is typical of the federal agencies participating in the Coordinated Framework. Id. at
23,303.
20. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 1980 & Supp. 1990).
21. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2671 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
22. Coordinated Framework, supra note 18, at 23,302, 23,314-15.
23. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370b (West 1977 & Supp. 1990).
24. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(a). The FIFRA application is limited to those genetically engineered
organisms (or their products) which are intended for use as a "pesticide," as defined by 7
U.S.C.A. § 136(u). See also, Coordinated Framework, supra note 18, at 23,315.
25. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D). Under FIFRA, a product causes "unreasonable adverse
effects" if it poses an "unreasonable risk" when balanced against "the economic, social, and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of [the] pesticide." Id. § 136(bb). The specific
registration requirements are detailed in 40 C.F.R. § 158 (1989).
26. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136c(a). Traditionally, the EPA exempted EUP requirements for small-
scale field tests (those less than ten acres). .But the EPA has eliminated this exemption for
deliberate release experiments of genetically engineered organisms. Coordinated Framework,
supra note 18, at 23,320-21.
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isms fall within the EUP requirements.27 Once the applicant complies
with EPA reporting requirements for an EUP, the experiment may
proceed unless the EPA determines that it will pose an "unreasonable
risk."'2  The EPA then reviews the data generated during small-scale
field testing. The EPA must register the product unless it can prove
that the product poses an "unreasonable risk.",29
The FIFRA permitting process offers a very limited opportunity for
public participation. The EPA publishes applications for EUPs "of
regional or national significance" 3 ° in the Federal Register. A public
hearing is possible if there is "sufficient interest."'"
b. Toxic Substances Control Act
TSCA is the regulatory catch-all statute. TSCA gives the EPA
authority to regulate all chemical substances32 which present an
"unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment."33 Under
the Coordinated Framework, TSCA covers genetically engineered
organisms not designed for use as pesticides, and therefore not regu-
lated under FIFRA. With TSCA, the EPA regulates the environmen-
tal release of genetically engineered organisms through
premanufacturing notification34 (PMN) and significant new use rule35
(SNUR) requirements. These require the manufacturer to provide a
wide variety of information regarding product efficacy and monitor-
ing.36 This information enables the EPA to assess the risks associated
with the new chemical substance. Simultaneously, the manufacturer
must establish a prima facie case for chemical substance safety by sub-
mitting any test data regarding the substance's health and environ-
27. Reporting requirements for EUP applications vary depending upon the source of the
introduced genetic material relative to the host organism. Coordinated Framework, supra note
18, at 23,321-22. The EPA must review EUP applications within ninety days. Id. at 23,321.
28. Id. at 23,323-24.
29. See id. at 23,323-24.
30. 40 C.F.R. § 172.11(a) (1989).
31. Id. at § 172.11(b).
32. A chemical substance is defined by statute as "any organic or inorganic substance of a
particular molecular identity, including . . . any combination of such substances occurring in
whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction." 15 U.S.C.A. § 2602(2)(A) (emphasis added).
The EPA claims authority to regulate genetically engineered organisms because
"[m]icroorganisms and their DNA molecules are 'chemical substances'." Coordinated
Framework, supra note 18, at 23,324 (emphasis added).
33. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2603-05.
34. Id. at § 2604.
35. Id. at § 2604(a)(1)(B).
36. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 18, at 23,326-27, 23,330. See also, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2604(a), (b), (d), 2607(b); 40 C.F.R. §§ 720-721 (1989).
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mental effects which are in the manufacturer's possession or control.3 7
Once the PMN or the SNUR is submitted, the EPA may require the
manufacturer to develop further information to aid in predicting
health and environmental effects of product use.38 PMN and SNUR
review must be completed by the EPA within 90 days of submission.39
Once the manufacturer establishes prima facie proof of product effi-
cacy, the EPA has the burden of determining whether manufacturing
and releasing the chemical substance presents an unreasonable risk to
the environment.4 The EPA maintains copies of submitted PMNs,
with confidential business information deleted, for public review.
41
The public is afforded a 30-day period after the PMN is made avail-
able to provide comments to the EPA. 2
c. National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA requires federal agencies to document and consider the
potential environmental effects of their actions.4" NEPA imposes no
substantive environmental protection standards. Agency deci-
sionmakers need not give any particuflar weight to environmental con-
cerns; environmental protection is only one of many factors
considered.' NEPA's EIS requirements apply to deliberate release
experiments where a federal agency has oversight responsibility.45
37. Coordinated Framework, supra note 18, at 23,326. See 40 C.F.R. § 720.50 (1989); 3
RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND Toxic SUBSTANCEs 375 (1988). PMN
requirements for small-scale field testing have been outlined by the EPA. See Coordinated
Framework, supra note 18, at 23,327-28.
38. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2603(a).
39. Id. § 2604(c); Coordinated Framework, supra note 18, at 23,330 (an additional 90-day
extension is available).
40. RODGERS, supra note 6, at 375. "[TMhe realities of commercial momentum, time lags in
the acquisition of studies, the necessities of administrative justification, and difficulties of
interpretation may conspire to fix on the agency the lion's share of legal responsibility
customarily associated with burden of proof." Id. at 376.
41. Coordinated Framework, supra note 18, at 23,328.
42. Id.
43. The heart of NEPA is section 102(2)(C), codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
This section directs federal agencies to compile an environmental impact statement (EIS) on
every "recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id.
44. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 'U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1979).
45. For example, in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1985), the court enjoined a deliberate release experiment until the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) properly complied with EIS requirements. The court required NIH approval because the
experiments were conducted at an institution receiving NIH funds for genetic engineering
research. 756 F.2d 143, 150 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Note however, that under the functional
equivalency doctrine the EPA is not always required to prepare a formal NEPA EIS. If the EPA
action occurs within a regulatory framework that emphasizes consideration of environmental
253
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2. State Regulatory Schemes: The North Carolina Genetically
Engineered Organisms Act
A few states have supplemented the Coordinated Framework regu-
latory scheme with additional legislation.46 North Carolina passed the
most comprehensive statute to date.47 The North Carolina Geneti-
cally Engineered Organisms Act (North Carolina Act) is designed "to
regulate the release and commercial use of genetically engineered
organisms in order to protect agriculture, public health, and the envi-
ronment."' 48 The purpose of the North Carolina Act is to provide a
means of assessing "the potential risks and effects of releases of geneti-
cally engineered organisms without undue governmental interference
with the progress and commercial development of biotechnology."49
The North Carolina Act prohibits the deliberate release of a geneti-
cally engineered organism without prior authorization.5 ° Under the
North Carolina Act, the permitting process parallels any correspond-
ing federal permit requirements. If necessary, however, the state
authority may impose more stringent limitations on the methods and
extent of release or even deny, suspend or revoke any permit.5 '
The Genetic Engineering Review Board52 (the Review Board) is
authorized to carry out the provisions of the North Carolina Act.5 3
The Review Board consists of ten members: three political appointees
from the state Departments of Natural Resources and Community
Development, Human Resources, and Agriculture; four representa-
tives from local universities; and one representative each from a public
issues in a manner similar to that required under NEPA, a formal EIS is not required. See
RODGERS, supra note 6, at 68-70.
46. State legislation addressing the deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms
ranges from directing an environmental quality board to study the question, see, e.g., MINN.
STAT. §§ 1161C.91-.95 (1988), to requiring concurrent state agency notification when federal
pre-release approval is required, see, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111.5, paras. 7601-11 (1988), Wis.
STAT. § 146.60 (1988).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-765 to -777 (1989). The North Carolina Act has been touted as
"a watershed in the previous polarization between the biotech industry, academic groups, public
interests advocates and government officials regarding environmental biotech issues." Mackler,
ABC Dialog, GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov./Dec. 1989, at 63.
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-767.
49. Id. § 106-765.
50. The North Carolina Act sets forth the requirement for authorization as follows: "[a]
genetically engineered organism may not be released into the environment, or sold, offered for
sale, or distributed for release into the environment unless a permit for its release has been issued
pursuant to this Article." Id. § 106-772.
51. Id. Violators of the North Carolina Act are subject to a civil penalty of not more than
$10,000. Id. § 106-776.
52. Id. § 106-769.
53. Id. § 106-770.
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interest organization, a farm organization, and the biotechnology
industry. 4
The North Carolina Act requires public notice of all proposed
releases.55 Any person may request a public hearing, but the Review
Board has ultimate control over such requests. 6 In all cases, the
Review Board must rule on a permit request within 150 days of appli-
cation .5  The North Carolina Act provides for limited public access to
confidential business information if required for effective review. 8
II. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO REGULATING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL RELEASE OF GENETICALLY
ENGINEERED ORGANISMS: INEFFECTIVE
REGULATION
The primary purpose of environmental legislation, in the face of
uncertainties like those posed by genetic engineering, should be the
preservation of environmental integrity. "Environmental integrity" is
the health of the diverse biological and chemical interrelationships
which are the fabric of ecological systems. Legislation designed to
preserve environmental integrity should have three goals. First, to
ensure that agencies properly weigh environmental values, environ-
mental legislation should establish strong substantive standards for
environmental protection. Second, because protecting environmental
integrity is a community concern, environmental legislation should
promote meaningful public participation in regulatory decisionmak-
ing. Finally, environmental legislation should provide a stable, pre-
dictable regulatory structure for the commercial development of
beneficial technologies.
A. Substantive Environmental Protection and the Current
Regulatory Schemes
The current regulatory structure fails to provide substantive envi-
ronmental protection. At best, the Coordinated Framework adopts a
weak "unreasonable risk" standard that strongly favors industry.59 At
54. Id. § 106-769.
55. Id. § 106-773. At a minimum, public notice is given through publication in general
circulation newspapers in counties where the release is to take place. Id.
56. Id. If the Review Board determines that there is sufficient public interest to justify a
hearing, the hearing is held in the county where the proposed release will occur. Id. § 106-
773(b).
57. Id § 106-773. This period may be extended with the applicant's consent. Id.
58. Id. § 106-774.
59. See supra notes 25, 33 and accompanying text.
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worst, it merely imposes ineffective procedural hurdles to commercial
development.' Although the North Carolina Act is an earnest step
forward, it fails to include adequate substantive criteria in its regula-
tory structure.
1. Federal Regulation Provides Little Substantive Environmental
Protection
The Coordinated Framework does not sufficiently protect the envi-
ronment. The first problem is that no federal law imposes strong sub-
stantive standards. For example, NEPA guidelines are purely
procedural. NEPA delineates the steps to an "environmentally
informed" agency decision but requires nothing in terms of substan-
tive results. NEPA is indifferent to outcomes provided the agency fol-
lows the appropriate procedures.6" Requiring an EIS merely ensures
that an agency considers potential environmental consequences.
The substantive standards in TSCA and FIFRA are weak as well.
Manufacturers are not required to prove that a deliberate release of a
genetically engineered product will meet an environmental safety stan-
dard. Instead, the Coordinated Framework statutes place the burden
on the agency to protect environmental integrity using meager sub-
stantive standards. For example, TSCA's standard of unreasonable
risk, because it is structured to avoid impeding technological innova-
tion, is biased in favor of product approval.62 The EPA must deter-
mine on the basis of the PMN that the substance may present an
unreasonable risk.6 3 But the EPA is under rigid time constraints to
determine the existence of unreasonable risk." If it fails to act within
90 days of PMN submission, with a possible 90-day extension, the
unevaluated environmental release may proceed.65 Therefore, manu-
facturers have little incentive to develop sufficient data on the environ-
mental risks associated with deliberate release experiments.
60. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
61. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 92 (1983). Courts are not free to
impose rigorous procedural hurdles as an alternative to substantive review. As the Supreme
Court stressed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 523-25 (1978),
courts are not free to impose "hybrid" procedures beyond those set out in NEPA and the
Administrative Procedures Act. Agency decisionmaking is procedurally confined only by
explicit statutory provisions.
62. "TSCA is known as a balancing law, invoking the noncommittal language of
'unreasonable risk' no less than thirty-eight times in a statute of sixty-four pages .... TSCA is the
only environmental statute to insist that regulation should not impede technological innovation."
RODGERS, supra note 6, at 372.
63. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2603(a), 2605(a).
64. Coordinated Framework, supra note 18, at 23,328.
65. Id.
256
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Similarly, under FIFRA a manufacturer need not meet a stringent
product safety standard, but merely has to show its product has "no
unreasonable adverse effects."66 To deny pesticide registration or an
EUP, EPA must evaluate the applicant's data and find that product
use would result in "unreasonable adverse effects" on the environ-
ment.67 Under both statutes, environmental protection varies with the
quantity and quality of data the agency demands. The utilitarian stan-
dards, combined with the limited resources of overtaxed federal agen-
cies, work to the applicant's advantage and against protecting the
environment.
Limited judicial oversight further compounds the shortcomings in
existing federal law. Courts are reluctant to scrutinize agency deci-
sions involving complex scientific questions beyond the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard.68 In effect, under this standard of review the
courts are removed from the decisionmaking process in all but the
most extreme cases of abuse of agency discretion. The statute that
guides agency decisionmaking must identify explicit substantive envi-
ronmental protection standards for the courts to reach a substantive
environmental safety issue, so that the courts have law to apply. This
makes the articulation of environmental safety standards especially
important.
2. The North Carolina Act Fails to Adequately Promote Substantive
Environmental Protection
While the North Carolina Act acknowledges public concern over
the unknown risks associated with the environmental release of geneti-
cally engineered organisms, it adds little to the substantive environ-
mental protection afforded by the Coordinated Framework. Although
the North Carolina Act seems to elevate protection of the environment
above the unreasonable risk criteria of TSCA,69 it timidly places this
burden on commercial development. Each mention of environmental
protection is offset by language promoting commercial development.70
66. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
67. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(5).
68. Davis, The "Shotgun Wedding" of Science and Law: Risk Assessment and Judicial Review,
10 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 67, 97 (1985). See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87,
97-98 (1983) (agency "expertise" demands extreme deference by the Court).
69. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
70. The North Carolina Act states, "it is incumbent upon the State ... to take responsible,
timely and minimally burdensome measures to ensure that the public and the environment are
protected and that risks from the environmental use of new genetically engineered organisms are
promptly addressed, while simultaneously allowing biotechnological research and product
development to advance." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-765 (1989).
257
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Further, the North Carolina Act fails to specify the duty deci-
sionmakers owe to environmental protection. The North Carolina
Act requires that whenever possible the Review Board work "in con-
cert with the federal regulatory authorities," utilizing "forms or for-
mats required by the federal government for actions similar to those
regulated under [the Act and] base its decision on the data submitted
with the federal application."'" Thus, the standard of environmental
protection under the North Carolina Act depends upon the applicable
federal statutory requirements because the evidence a manufacturer
must produce to satisfy the regulatory environmental assessment will
vary in relation to the federal requirements. Most importantly, the
North Carolina Act fails to clarify whether the manufacturer or the
agency carries the burden of showing the safety or risk of a proposed
release.
B. Public Participation and the Current Regulatory Schemes
Under the Coordinated Framework, communities are powerless in
the environmental review and decision-making process. The North
Carolina Act provides some improvement over the Coordinated
Framework, but meaningful public participation in agency decision-
making remains limited.
1. Federal Regulation Does Not Promote Meaningful Public
Participation in the Environmental Review Process
The existing matrix of federal statutes establishes meaningful partic-
ipation between manufacturers and the agencies. The process, how-
ever, leaves out those most affected by any unforeseen hazards-the
local communities. Generally, public comment is invited only through
notification of a contemplated release in the Federal Register.72 Fed-
eral statutes do not require agencies to notify local communities of
contemplated releases in their area. The Coordinated Framework also
includes few mechanisms for direct public intervention and participa-
tion in agency review of environmental release permits. The scarcity
of mechanisms for participation and the highly technical nature of the
issues driving the decisionmaking operate to exclude most community
members from meaningful participation in agency decisionmaking.7 3
71. Id. § 106-772(b).
72. See supra notes 30-31, 41-42 and accompanying text.
73. This has led some environmental groups to reduce grassroots educational efforts and
increase internal scientific and legal expertise, further hampering public involvement. See
Pollack, Reimagining NEPA: Choices for Environmentalists, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 359,
362-63 (1985).
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2. The North Carolina Act Fails to Adequately Promote Meaningful
Public Participation in the Environmental Review Process
The North Carolina Act improves upon the Coordinated Frame-
work in several ways. First, it provides for community involvement
through public notice and comment, and through discretionary public
hearings.7 Second, the North Carolina Act provides a mechanism for
access to otherwise confidential business information a's long as it is
necessary for effective participation in the permit review process.75
Finally, the North Carolina Act creates a broader decision-making
base by mandating a diverse Review Board membership.76 The
broader spectrum of representation on the Review Board may foster
more meaningful public participation by expanding the scope of issues
considered during rulemaking and permit review.
Although these components improve the Coordinated Framework,
the North Carolina Act nullifies one of the few effective tools local
communities use to control their immediate environment-the local
environmental ordinance.77 The North Carolina Act requires locali-
ties to funnel their concerns into the notice and comment and discre-
tionary hearing procedures rather than allowing more stringent local
ordinances. Given the North. Carolina Act's weak substantive envi-
ronmental standards,7" it is unlikely that the environmental concerns
of North Carolina localities will be properly addressed in the permit-
ting process.
C. The Current Regulatory Effects on Industry
The balkanized federal jurisdiction and the conglomeration of stat-
utes, regulations, and guidelines under the Coordinated Framework
are complex and confusing. Compliance with current regulations
unnecessarily wastes industrial resources. The North Carolina Act
makes the process more efficient by granting oversight authority to a
single agency. The North Carolina Act also provides increased stabil-
ity by prohibiting regulation below the state level.
74. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
75. Ultimately, the Review Board determines whether the information should be disclosed.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-774 (1989).
76. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
77. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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1. The Coordinated Framework Provides an Unstable Regulatory
Environment
The Coordinated Framework inefficiently regulates technological
development. Currently, businesses seeking to move their genetic
engineering research and development efforts from the laboratory into
the environment must find their way through the Coordinated Frame-
work agency and jurisdictional maze.79 Unless the various federal
agencies coordinate their regulatory efforts and unify their regulatory
requirements, variable substantive standards of review will result. 80
This does not promote the predictable, consistent regulatory environ-
ment which is essential for industry to develop intelligent testing pro-
grams directed toward well-defined standards. An unpredictable
regulatory environment wastes resources unnecessarily.8
2. The North Carolina Act Provides a Stable Regulatory
Environment
The North Carolina Act minimizes the regulatory burden on the
biotechnology industry by centralizing oversight authority and by
prohibiting local regulation of environmental releases. Unlike the bal-
kanized federal scheme, the Review Board under the North Carolina
Act is responsible for all proposed environmental releases of geneti-
cally engineered organisms. Thus, the Review Board can provide con-
sistent, predictable oversight.
One of the primary deficiencies in risk assessment of environmental
releases is the lack of comprehensive field-testing data. As part of the
permitting requirements, the Review Board reviews data submitted
with corresponding federal permit applications.82 In effect, the North
Carolina Department of Agriculture acts as a clearinghouse for all
proposed releases within their jurisdiction. Presumably, the North
Carolina Department of Agriculture will develop the expertise to
assess proposed releases quickly and competently. As the agency's
knowledge grows, its increasing efficiency will benefit industry by
making environmental regulations less burdensome and less expensive.
79. Unpredictable regulatory requirements and potential time delays translate into increased
costs. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
80. In theory, the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, under the auspices of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy, coordinates the agencies associated with the
Coordinated Framework. Coordinated Framework, supra note 18, at 23,306. The Committee's
authority and vitality, however, are questionable. See Recommendations of the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 1 C.F.R. § 305.89-7 (1990).
81. See, INVESTMENT, supra note 16, at 11.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-772 (1989).
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The North Carolina Act also prevents local counties and municipal-
ities from enacting further regulations governing the release of geneti-
cally engineered organisms. 3 If local governments in other states feel
that federal or state regulators do not provide adequate community
protection, they may act to protect themselves. For example, in 1986,
despite National Institutes of Health (NIH) and EPA review and a
court challenge,84 the Monterey County, California, Board of Supervi-
sors used a county ordinance to halt a proposed field test. 5 If the
federal regulatory structure does not provide adequate environmental
protection, local governments may produce even more extensive regu-
lations in the future. Local regulations compound the time and
expense required for biotechnology companies to gain approval for
deliberate releases. The North Carolina Act prevents local interven-
tion, creating a regulatory climate more conducive to the safe and effi-
cient development of genetic engineering technology.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMPREHENSIVE
REGULATION
New legislation is needed to correct the shortcomings of the current
regulatory framework.86 The legislation must ensure the protection of
environmental integrity through firm substantive standards and review
procedures designed to enforce them. New legislation should also
include broader mechanisms for community involvement in the
agency decision-making process. Finally, review of proposed deliber-
83. Section 106-775 states that "[n]o county or municipality shall enact any regulation or
ordinance regulating the release of genetically engineered organisms." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-
775 (1989).
84. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas, 637 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D.D.C. 1986);
Howard, Halting Designer Bacteria, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1986, at 8.
85. The Monterey County ordinance required a local land use permit because of the danger to
public health posed by the use of "animals" (bacteria) in the experiment. See Sun, Local
Opposition Halts Biotechnology Test, 231 SCIENCE 667 (1986); A Novel Strain of Recklessness,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1986, at E22, col. 1. The EPA subsequently suspended its approval of the
field test and fined the company $13,000 when it discovered that environmental release
experiments had been conducted without approval. See Sun, EPA Reduces Penalty Against
Biotech Firm, 232 SCIENCE 1495 (1986). Clearly the Monterey County Board of Supervisors'
concern was appropriate.
86. Numerous corrective alternatives have been suggested by other authors. See, eg.,
Deatherage, Scientific Uncertainty in Regulating Deliberate Release of Genetically Engineered
Organisms Substantive Judicial Review and InstitutionalAlternatives, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
203 (1987) (less deferential standard of judicial review and unified agency authority); Note, The
Rutabaga That Ate Pittsburgh: Federal Regulation of Free Release Biotechnology, 72 VA. L. REv.
1529 (1986) (clarify agency jurisdiction, stiffen reporting requirements, and create a centralized
data bank).
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ate releases should be concentrated under a centralized federal
authority.
A. Substantive Environmental Protection
The current federal and state regulatory frameworks offer inade-
quate standards for review of proposed deliberate releases. New legis-
lation must elevate the importance of protecting natural ecosystems in
deliberate release decisionmaking. Protecting environmental integrity
in the face of the uncertainties associated with the environmental
release of genetically engineered organisms should be paramount. A
strong presumption toward preserving environmental integrity should
be explicit in the statute.
The burden of proving product safety should fall on those who cre-
ate the risk to the environment.87 The law cannot realistically require
eliminating all risk, but the standard of certainty must shift toward
safety and preventing environmental degradation. A minimal risk
standard is acceptable.
New legislation should include product "essentiality" criteria. An
agency should consider the following three factors: (1) the degree to
which application of the new organism may replace other, more envi-
ronmentally intrusive, technologies; (2) the degree to which the new
use causes environmental degradation through increased chemical or
pesticide use and other hazards; and (3) the degree to which other less
intrusive or more predictable alternatives are available to accomplish a
similar function. 8
These essentiality criteria should be included in NEPA EIS require-
ments. Consideration of direct and indirect environmental effects,
alternatives to proposed actions, and mitigation plans are all elements
of environmental impact assessments.8 9  The essentiality criteria
should be incorporated in the assessment process. Preserving environ-
mental integrity should be the primary value guiding the decision-
making process. Including essentiality criteria would add strong envi-
87. For example, in 1986, Congress considered a bill that placed the burden on the party
applying for a permit under the Coordinated Framework. The appropriate provision stated,
"[tihe applicant or permit holder shall at all times have the burden of demonstrating that the
activities in question will not constitute an unreasonable risk to human health, welfare, or the
environment." H.R. 4452, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. H1433 (1986) (the
Biotechnology Science Coordination Act of 1986).
88. FIFRA specifically excludes an essentiality test from the pesticide authorization process.
7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(c)(5) (1980).
89. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502 (1989).
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ronmentally protective standards to the Coordinated Framework's sci-
entific criteria.
B. Promoting Meaningful Community Participation
In a democratic system, communities must be able to actively par-
ticipate with agencies in decisions shaping their environment. 90
Administrative decisionmaking should not merely operate on the pub-
lic's behalf, but should also encourage public deliberation of such
important decisions.91 New legislation should foster meaningful pub-
lic participation in agency review of deliberate release experiments.
Participation in agency decisionmaking requires resources and
expertise that are not generally available to the public. New legisla-
tion should support public interest representation and advocacy. 92
Two possible alternatives for this support are agency appointed coun-
sel93 and a separately financed organization to represent public inter-
ests.94  Legislation should provide adequate financing,95  ensure
independence from the regulated industry and the regulating agency,
90. Obviously, community participation occurs through the electoral process but
environmental decisions are predominantly made at the federal or state agency level. Although
new technologies are embraced with little public scrutiny or debate, their adoption may greatly
affect the quality of the community environment. See Winner, Technology as Legislation, in LIFE
AFrER '80: ENVIRONMENTAL CHOIcEs WE CAN LIVE WITH 152, 157 (K. Courrier ed. 1980).
Legislation should encourage community participation in assessing new technologies. See Sewell
& O'Riordan, The Culture of Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1, 16 (1976).
91. See Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE
L.J. 1617, 1637 (1985). For a discussion of the many reasons justifying maximum citizen
participation, see McLachlan, Democratizing the Administrative Process: Toward Increased
Responsiveness, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 835, 850-52 (1971).
92. Promoting public involvement does not serve environmental protection alone. The public
is increasingly suspicious of scientists, more so of "impartial" government agencies, and even
more so of industry, especially where ethical and environmental issues are concerned.
Empowering local communities bolsters public confidence in the decision-making process and
leads to better understanding of the technology itself. Public trust is also built through educating
and involving the public. See Carter, The Bellman, the Snark, and the Biohazard Debate, 3
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 358, 392-93 (1985); see also, Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and The
People, 57 VA. L. REv. 1069, 1092-93 (1971).
93. For example, the Interstate Commerce Act gives the Interstate Commerce Commission
power to appoint counsel to represent unrepresented groups in their proceedings. 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 10301(f)(l) (1982). See also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 42, 57(a)(h) (1988) which give the Federal Trade
Commission authority to appoint counsel and to provide attorneys' fees. See generally Everett,
Financial Assistance For Public Interest Group Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking, 10
ENVTL. L. 483 (1980).
94. See Osborn, Federal Funds for Public Interest Law: Plausibility, Politics and Past History,
13 ARIz. L. REv. 932 (1971).
95. Financing could be maintained by charging the regulated industry for permits.
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ensure accountability to the public, and ensure availability of technical
expertise for meaningful participation.96
Finally, new legislation should ensure that deliberate release
rulemaking and permits are managed by a diverse group of specialists.
The North Carolina Act, with a diverse Review Board, 97 provides a
starting point for federal legislation. The ideal federal regulatory sys-
tem should be governed by an independent commission representing a
broad spectrum of academic specialties and a full range of community
interests.
C. Providing A Stable Regulatory Environment
The fifty states, with their imaginary boundaries and parochial
interests, should not be left to develop piecemeal legislation to control
the wide-ranging environmental impacts of the deliberate release of
genetically engineered organisms. If genetic engineering technology is
as successful as many believe it will be, the federal government should
not avoid taking a more active role in guiding its future. The appro-
priate legislative response should be carried out at the federal level.
Nationwide environmental protection must begin with a uniform,
safety-conscious regulatory framework. States should be able to sup-
plement this federal legislation when needed to suit their local
environment. 9
Until the federal governfient provides a comprehensive and effec-
tive statutory framework, however, states must act to protect their
environment. States should provide an efficient and predictable frame-
work for industrial growth as they address public concern over safety
and protecting the environment. Given the reality of genetic engineer-
ing technology, state legislatures must reduce the risks of the deliber-
ate release of genetically engineered organisms.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current regulatory framework guiding the development of
genetic engineering technology does not meet the goals of effective
environmental regulation. State and federal governments must
develop effective regulatory strategies while biotechnology is in its
infancy. Economic development of beneficial aspects of genetic engi-
neering technology can occur without undue risk to the environment.
96. Lazarus & Onek, supra note 92, at 1105.
97. See supra note 54.
98. Assessment of a proposed deliberate release should include consideration of the
peculiarities of the local environment.
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Regulatory approaches need only include a broader perspective. A
uniform statutory authority, which includes substantive environmen-
tal standards, procedural safeguards, and broad public participation,
will most effectively accomplish the goals of environmental regulation
of this industry.
Robert Saperstein
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